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THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF THE 
CAUSAL PRINCIPLE 
GEO'.RGE P . .AD.AMS 
Causality is a type of organizing principle imbedded within 
experience and constantly employed in the practical arts of life 
and in all the manifold ways in which living organisms are said 
to learn from experience. Causality occupies; a preeminent place 
among the organizing principles which experience malrns use of 
and relies upon as if they were· the most certain and obvious 
features of the things and processes with which all life and 
experience are concerned. Yet, when reflection supervenes upon 
life and experience, it is just these categorial, pervasive, struc-
tural, and organizing principles which become problematic. Re-
flection asks for their credentials. They are called upon to 
attest their validity before the bar of critical analysis and reflec-
tive thought. The crucial pungency of the philosophical problem 
of causality derives from a species, of unrest and disquiet which 
prevail just so long as the principles indispensable for life and 
experience can find no reasonable ba'>is for their validity. But 
considerable caution is advisable in formulating both the nature 
of such principles and the criterion of reasonable validity. Yet 
the problem remains. What measure of reasonable validity, if 
any, attaches to the foundations, the basic patterns of life and 
of knowledge, of the structures and processes: which are diiY 
played both in the human scene and in its environment 1 What 
happens when the organizing principles actually used in experi-
ence, both as theoretical and as practical, become the subject 
matter for critical reflection? 
Experience is prior to reflection in both 0£ the major mean-
ings of priority. In the 'temporal sense, there is experience before 
the processes of thought and reflection get under way. .Also, 
experience is: logically prior to reflection in the sense that there 
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could be no subject matter and material for reflective thought 
were it not for experience. Reflection is, as the word itself tells 
us, a turning around, a bending back upon something which is 
pre-reflective, something other than sheer vacuity. What other 
term can we use for this vast pre-reflective something save the 
term ''experience'' f We are to take it in its primarily denota-
tive sense in which it refers to whatever men live through, do 
and undergo, perceive, suffer and enjoy, plan for and regret, 
control, manipulate, and appreciate. These are all doings and 
,. havings, inseparably linked with things done and had, rich in 
content and scope, suffused with qualities and meanings, with 
motion, life, and efficacy, with success and frustration, hope and 
fear, gladness and sorrow. Here is na'ive, "macroscopic ex-
perience,'' '' coarse and vital experience,'' actual experience 
'' charged with history and prophecy.'' I have borrowed these 
phrases from Mr. Dewey, and I record my conviction of the 
important service to philosophy which he has render~d in calling 
us back to· this protean, primitive, and denotative sense of the 
term ''experience.'' I do this the more eagerly because I am 
unable to accept the major results to which, as he supposes, the 
priority of such experience commits us. 
I shall use the term '' primary experience'' to, denote that 
which precedes reflective thought and supplies its material. Pri-
mar;)" experience is clearly similar to what l\rf.r. Loewenberg has 
called "pre-analytical data," and to what Mr. Pepper has called 
"middle-sized .fact." The terms "datum" and "fact" however 
appear to suggest something more punctual and simple than the 
term '' primary experience'' which ho,lds in solution both factual 
items or data and relational patterns or organizing principles. 
The distinction between primary and reflective experience has 
its own hazards and perplexities. It might appear that any 
attempt to characterize. the world of primary experience, to 
describe its features and contents presupposes the prior adoption 
of a reflective attitude so that primary · experience cannot get 
itself described from its own non- or pre-reflective standpoint. 
The hope of so describing it may appear as fatuous as the 
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attempt to see what darkness looks like by turning on the light. 
But the simile is too misleading. Primary experience need not 
be dissipated by reflective thought as darkness is dissipated by 
light: Indeed, it cannot be so dispersf)d else there can be nothing 
to reflect upon and about. I shall not here pause further to 
track down this affair, but shall assume an ability to discover and 
discriminate features and aspects of primary experience, and to 
single them out for reflective consideration. 
There are patterns, schemata, and organizing principles pres-
ent and employed in primary experience. _These supply the link-
ages, the transitions, the conca.tenations of things by means of 
which one item of experience is taken to suggest, to imply, and 
to lead to other items. By virtue of such types of order and 
relational structure one occurrence is a sign of preceding and 
impending occurrences, the present is linked to the absent, the 
near at hand yields a clew to the distant and outlying. Things 
have potencies and tendencies, enduring natures and habits 
which elicit and demand plannings and expectations on -our part. 
Primary experience is never a punctual, momentary, and imme-
diate affair .. It is characterized by depth, solidity, and massive-
ness. This far-flung dimensionality is due to the_ effective 
presence within primary experience of categorial, organizing 
principles and relations. The two things here to stress are first, 
the operative presence within primary experience of such organ-
izing categories prior to their subsequent discovery through 
reflective analysis, and secondly, the fact that these categorial 
principles hold of things and events. They are used by primary 
experience because they belong to the texture of the thing'S and 
affairs with which primary experience deals. They are quite 
objective, if one may use an anachronism derived from reflective 
experience, after what is ''objective'' has got itself discriminated 
from the ''subjective.'' Primary experience is, for example, 
organized in terms of continuant things and . their qualities, 
active agents, means and ends, spatial and · temporal orders, 
causal efficacy, goods to be sought for and evils to be avoided, 
values to be prized and appreciated, only to name some of the 
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more obvious and pervasive traits actually found and used in 
pre-reflective experience. The features of experience denoted by 
such terms are not, within the framework of primary experience, 
alien intruders; they are not projected from without into any 
crude stuff .of experience. They are taken to be as much a part 
of the nature of things as are shapes and colors. They belong 
natmally to the domestic scenery and surroundings of man's life 
and activities. 
Among the organizing principles of pre-reflective, primary 
experience, causality occupies a central position. Its importance 
appears to be due to the part which it plays in our experience 
as practical. That it has a. wider meaning and scope will become 
evident in the course of the diswssion. However, it is the case 
that in all that men contrive, plan, and manipulate, in all pm-
posive behavior, the orderly potencies and efficacies of things are 
relied upon and are used. The natures of things are exhibited 
in the trains of events which they initiate and determine. And 
not only does man learn to count on the effects of causes whether 
initiated by himself or by nature. He also infers backwards and 
outwards from effects to their causes. There is no need to- exhibit 
in any detail the ways in which the principle of causality is 
constantly employed in prima.ry experience. 
But now turn to. reflective experience. Inquiry and analysis, 
thought and reflection, supervene upon primary experience. :Men 
not only live and act, contrive and enjoy; they inquire and they 
reflect. Reflection directs itself upon some integral feature of 
primary experience. Some cha.racteristic of that feature elicits 
reflection. Thought arises: from life and experience. What occa-
sions the transitio11 from primary experience to reflection 1 I 
shall accept the broad s.tatement that reflection is elicited by some 
problematic feature of primary experience. Pailure, obstruction, 
collision, contradiction, hesitation, such terms as these may serve 
to denote what kind of .thing it is in primary experience which 
generates inquiry and reflection. But merely to say this is not 
enough. There are problems! and problems. In particular, I wish 
to distinguish two kinds of problematic situations and two cor-
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responding types of problem and inquiry. This distinction will 
be seen to have a definite bearing upon the problem of causality. 
The perplexity may in the first place be focussed in some specific 
thing or nature, some specific item, term, or context. What is the 
square root of two, when will the next full moon occur, what are 
the chemical constituents of this substance, what are the causes 
of muscular contraction, what will happen if the total supply of 
currency be increased-these are all specific problems. There is 
one important kind of specific problem which may be labeled 
'pragmatic.' It is of this general type. What specifically shall 
I do, or what specifically is to be done, if a certain result is to 
be attained? It concerns the f aciendum of some definite situa-
tion. While all pragmatic problems are specific, not all specific 
problems are pragmatic, though they may well involve pragmatic 
problems in the inquiries leading to their solution. The question 
what is the square root of two is a specific problem, but not 
pragmatic. But the question what shall I do if I want to ascer-
tain the square root of two is a pragmatic question. Now it is 
to be noted that all specific problems involve the use of some 
general concept or organizing principle. The question I have 
just instanced uses the category of number, and of irrational 
number. The question as to when the next full moon will occur 
contains the category of time. It is the same with all the others. 
Are there, now, any significant problems. which fall outside the 
range of such specific and pragmatic inquiries? I think that 
there are, and in so thinking I part company with Pragmatism. 
Not only do we inquire into the natures, contexts, and concatena-
tions of specific items. We also inquire into the meaning and the 
validity of those more pervasive, orga.nizing principles. whose 
presence and use in primary experience has been noted. Such 
problems may be called 'reflective.' Instead of looking for the 
square root of a specific number, or of solving a particular equa-
tion, we now become interested in the nature and the validity of 
the basic concepts used in specific inquiries. Categories which 
are employed in pre-reflective experience now become the objects 
of reflective scrutiny. It is they which have become problematic. 
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The difference in kind between a specific and a reflective 
problem becomes apparent when we note that no answer to a 
reflective inquiry gives us any direct aid in answering a specific 
question, and vice versa. .An illustration will show what I mean. 
We a.re interested, in common sense and in science, in ma.king 
accurate reports and descriptions of things and events. These 
are the outcome of specific inquiries. But one may be concerned 
with the question as to what is meant by the predicate ''true'' 
which is used or implied in all specific assertions. Now no- theory 
of truth, which is a reflective affair, can be of any help to me in 
deciding whether it is true o-r false that three times five is twenty, 
or as to the truth or falsity of any other specific assertion or 
hypothesis. Likewise, no answer to the reflective problem as to 
the nature and validity of memory and knowledge of the past 
will help me to answer the specific question, did I or did I not 
lock the front door before coming upstairs. Ethics provides an 
instructive instance of the same fundamental distinction. It 
is one thing to ask what I ought to do in such ~nd such specific 
circumstances. This is a pragmatic question. It is quite another 
thing to reflect upon the meaning and the validity of the cate-
gory of obligation itself. A pragmatic problem is prospective 
and forward looking; a reflective problem arises only when one 
stops acting, pauses, turns around and wonders whether the 
course he has been pursuing, whether the instruments and 
principles he has been using are indeed valid. 
The distinction between specific or pragmatic and reflective 
problems applies to causality. First there is the question as to 
the specific causal antecedents and consequences of any assign-
able occurrence. This is a specific problem, and is never remote 
from a pragmatic problem. Secondly, there is the reflective prob-
lem with respect to the nature and validity of the general prin-
ciple of causality which we constantly use in primary experience 
and in science. In his Enqiliry, Hmne is concerned chiefly with 
the question as to the grounds for saying that some specific event 
is the cause o-f some definite effect. In the Treatise, he raises the 
question as to the validity of the general causal principle itself. 
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Here, too, no reflective theory about the nature and validity of 
the principle of causality will help either the practical man or 
the scientist to know whether the causes of event E are to be 
located in A. or B or C, or what specific causal sequence must be 
initiated in order to secure some desired end. .The reflective 
interest in ascertaining the nature and validity of tho-se organiz-
ing principles which we do as a fact use in practical life and 
also in science is different from the interest which generates a 
specific or a pragmatic problem. Reflective inquiries are sterile 
and pragmatically otiose with respect to specific and pra.gmatic 
inquiries. 
The distinction here in question roughly corresponds to the 
difference between science and philosophy: Mr. Stout has char-
acterized science in this way. 
The beginning and end of science are found in the particular co-existences 
and sequences which are accessible to observation aJ1d experiment. The 
knowledge sought by the man of science is such only as may or might, 
directly or indirectly, help us to anticipate that when a particular event of 
the sort A occurs, another of the sort B succeeds, or precedes or coexists in 
a certain assigna.ble way. Science is knowledge of this typo carried at once 
to the highest attainable degree of systematic generality aJ1d comprehen-
siveness, and to the highest a.ttainable degree of de-tailed precision. (Mind 
a-nil, Matter, 12-13.) 
Now I do not think that philosophy is an expansion or continua-
tion of this type of inquiry .. To ask the reflective or philosophical 
question about causality, to inquire concerning its meaning and 
validity, is to search for theoretical understanding and intelli-
gibility with respect to an organizing principle present in experi-
ence before it is reflected upon. If it be asked why we bother 
ourselves with reflective problems, rather than concentrate our 
energies upon specific and pragmatic inquiries, I shall here but 
point to an impelling, de fa:cto interest which we have in accept-
ing and employing only those organizing principles of life and of 
knowledge whose claim to validity has some warrant. Our con-
cern for the validity of such basic principles is on all fours with 
the demand for the maximum of reasonableness in the choice of 
our loyalties, in our ultimate preferences and governing ideals. 
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Before we can make any headway with the reflective problem 
about causality, we need some description of the causal prin-
ciple as it appears in primary experience. Any such description 
will be tentative and subject to revision. It will be a sort of 
denotative pointing to a general kind of organizing principle 
which is pre-reflectively had and employed. Unless it can be 
pointed out, noted, and described in some such preliminary fash-
ion, there is simply nothing to reflect upon. Unless there is in 
this case as in all others some continuity between description and 
reference, there is no problem at all. True it is that every 
description exhibits some trace of theory, while reference pur-
ports to point to facts. Yet this tension between description and 
reference cannot be stretched to the breaking point, else there 
is nothing to describe, and reference becomes meaningless. Refer-
. ence is incipient description, and description is expanded refer-
ence. I have dealt more at Ieng-th elsewhere with this living 
continuity between discourse and reality, between perspective 
and fact. There is a difference between a reflective theory of 
causality and the actual presence of and employment of the 
causal principle in primary experience. It is the unreflectively 
used causal principle which has to expand into the reflective 
theory of causality. Reflection is the medium in which the in-
gredients of primary experience may g-row into theories. A 
theory is true if .it is the expansion and . expression in this 
medium of things had in primary experience. 
The causal principle, in its most comprehensive form, is the 
principle of non-indifference. No thing or event is indifferent 
to its surroundings. The context in which events happen has a 
determining influence bo,th upon the nature of events and upon 
their occurrence. There is no, event which is loose and separate, 
wholly self-contained. Draw the boundary between individual 
things and occurrences wherever you wish. From across any 
boundary line you may draw, there are invasions and intrusions. 
There come factors and influences which are effective in deter-
mining the nature of whatever is included within the boundaries. 
Things are not indifferent to the context in ,;,vhich they exist. 
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Such relevance of context is descriptive of the processes and 
ingredients of nature. It is dynamic and effectual. The differ-
ence made by context is not merely a difference of meaning, such 
as occurs in language and discourse. To say that actual things 
and occasions are not indifferent to one another, to specify the 
dynamic relevance of context, is to invoke the wider concept of 
organization. That is, the principle of causal determination, as 
it is used in primary experience, is never remote from the notion 
that certain events comprise systems, organized individual totali-
ties, :within which real determination of ingredients occurs. I 
mention this here because I do not think it correct to say that 
the notion of organization is an intrusion of some one philo-
sophical theory, and that for other competing types of philosoph-
ical theory of causality the notion can be dispensed with. This 
is what I take Mr. Pepper to have said. Causal determination 
means non-indifference, and non-indifference means some kind 
of organization. The question of what kind of organization may 
indeed lead to rival theories. Remember that we have foe prob-
lem on our hands only because we first have and use the principle 
of causality in primary experience. The problem arises only 
because the things and events of primary experience are organ-
ized precisely in the degree to which they are not indifferent to 
one another; 
I have laid stress upon the fact that prima!'Y experience is 
in de f a.cto possession of the causal principle. It is reflection 
which scrutinizes the title of the various possessions of primary 
experience, especially those principles which primary experience 
employes. Is its ownership of causality de jiire as well as de 
facto? Hume, we well know, answers this question in the nega-
tive. Most of the central issues concerning the nature and valid-
ity of the principle of causal determination are touched upon 
in Hume's classical discussion. In this affair, every one must 
settle his accounts with Hume. But now, in Hume's answer to 
the question whether primary experience ◊"wns the causal prin-
ciple de jitre as well as de f a.cto, a curious thing happens. The 
experience which we started with, which laid claim to the prin-
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ciple of causality, is not at all the same experience whose title 
to causality is declared by Hume to be invalid. It is as if a 
defendant were brought into court in de facto possession of 
goods, and the question arises whether or not these goods are 
stolen property. He has, de facto, the goods in question. But no•w 
let the prisoner be quietly replaced by another defendant who is 
not even a de fa-cto owner of the goods, and then let the sentence 
be pronounced that the original defendant's claim to the prop-
erty is invalid because as a fact the present defendant is not in 
possession of the goods. This is precisely what Hume does. Pri-
mary experience is the defendant. It is brought to the bar of 
reflection on the charge of being in unlawful possession of the 
principle of causality. Primary experience now disappears and 
is replaced by impressions. This new defendant, upon being 
asked whether he does as a fact possess the principle of causal 
determination replies correctly that he does not. The verdict is 
then brought in that the original defendant is guilty of theft, 
that he has stolen the principle of causality from subjective 
custom, habit, and psychological expectation. 
The term 'experience, ' as used by Hume and by classical 
empiricism, does indeed denote something quite different from 
that which we found primary, pre-reflective experience to be and 
to contain. F'or Hume, experience means that which reflective 
analysis discloses to be the indubitably immediate datum or pos-
session which has the maximum nearness and cognitive certainty. 
Reflective analysis enormously narrows the, range and depth of 
pre-reflective, macroscopic experience. It eliminates from pri-
mary experience all distant and outlying ingredients, whatever 
is not immediately given and present. Innumerable contextual, 
meaningful qualities and structures which comprise the very 
life of primary experience, are found not to belong to reflective 
and analytical experience. They become problematic, inferential, 
more or less spurious and illegitimate accretions to the hard, 
solid data which reflective analysis is said to yield. In primary 
experience we experience, i.e., we remember the past; we experi-
ence, i.e., we perceive substantive continuant things; we ex--
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perience, i.e., we recognize and converse with other selves; we 
experience, i.e., we rely upon the potential effica.cies of forces 
and tendencies to issue in determinate results; we experience, 
i.e., we anticipate the future; we experience, i.e., we appreciate 
the beauty of sunset and ocean waves:. The list could be extended. 
But turn from these examples of primary experience to reflective 
experience. Ask, in each instance, what it is that is indubitably 
had in immediate experience. The experience or memory of the 
past now becomes the existence in the present of a memory 
image. Its linkage with the remembered past is ascribed to some 
dimension other than literally immediate experience. The per-
ception of things now becomes the presence of sense data, and 
the substantive thing drops out as something inferred or pro-
jected. Our recognition of other selves becomes an inference 
through analogy from directly experienced qualia. Our reliance 
upon the efficacies: of things becomes the perceived sequences of 
impressions and our present expectations o,f similar sequences in 
the future. Our appreciation of values becomes the immed~ately 
felt satisfactions and. pleasures present in the direct experience 
of the beholder or ag·ent. No one can be oblivious of the wide 
gulf which separates things experienced in the primary sense 
from clear and simple ideas, impressions, sensa, essences, et id 
genus ornne, of a Descartes, a Hume, a Russell, a Santayana. The 
concepts, the categorial relational principles of space and time, 
substance and causality, self and nature, good and evil-these 
are the perennial themes of philosophical reflection precisely 
because first, they are imbedded within and employed by primary 
experience and, secondly, they are not readily resolvable into 
presented data. They comprise a problematic residuum after 
reflective analysis has performed its task, after it has disclosed 
whatever is supposed to be directly present in immediate experi-
ence. Such elements alone appear to survive the test of presenta-
tional immediacy. Judged by this standard, whatever other 
features characterize primary experience are illegitimate posses-
sions without valid title. 
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Now it can occasion no surprise that Hume was unable to 
locate the organizing principles of experience in immediate ex-
perience or impressions because the function of such principles 
is precisely to link the immediate with the more remote and out-
lying. They denote the schemata and patterns according to 
which items are related and which we follow in making infer-
ences from observed to unobserved matter of fact. It is impos-
sible for them to be telescoped and compressed within the directly 
observed and present, and it is preposterous to look for them 
there. To surmise that they ought to be directly observable in 
impressions and to be somehow baffled in not finding them there 
is like supposing that a bridge across a river ought not to leave 
the bank, or like asking one to confine his scrutiny solely to the 
bricks comprising a brick wall and then locate the cement. 
Yet Hume does allow for one sort of bridge and he thereby 
mars the strict logic of his position. He admits the temporal 
sequence of impressions, and the knowledge of such sequences. 
Memory of past sequences breeds in us the expectation of similar 
sequences in the future. Repetition of coexistences and sequences 
does not in the slightest modify the loose and separate natures 
of particular existences themselves. Repetition of temporal con-
junctions provides no evidence that impressions so conjoined 
have any other relation than merely temporal. The repetition of 
sequences merely brings about a psychological habit or custom 
of anticipating an event of a certain kind when another sort of 
event occurs and is presented. I think Mr. Stout is quite right 
in saying on this subject that "this merely psychological fact 
supplies no reason why the belief should be true. We must not 
confuse our habit of expecting with a habit followed by the 
events themselves in happening." (Mincl and Matter, 27.) The 
belief that an event y will, with greater or less probability, follow 
an event x .is a valid and reasonable belief only if the temporal 
succession x-y supplies evidence of some connection between x 
and y over and above the temporal relation of sequence. This is 
just what, on Hume's showing, the events do not have. Each 
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occurrence is loose and separate. So far as the real natures and 
relations of events are concerned, anything could follow anything. 
Hume's analysis of causality is the outcome of a process of 
::;implification. Primary experience employs a variety of rela-
tional structures, of categorial connections between items. 
Primary experience is the locus of many different types of 
organization with varying ranges of inclusiveness and modes of 
connection. This rich variety of relational ties and modes of 
organization is by Hume simplified and resolved into the single 
relation of temporal sequence. Even contiguity in space is in 
the end, for Hume, an affair solely of temporal relations. That 
is, Hume does for types of relation and of organization what the 
reflective analysis of science and philosophy appear ever to have 
done with respect to primarily experienced diversity. Reflection 
seems driven to accord to one quality or type a privileged status, 
and to resolve all other qualities into it. There results the 
judgment of identity. What originally appears as different 
from: x really is x. Hume's resolution of causal determination 
into temporal sequence is a precise analogue of Thales' reduction 
of the wide diversity of natural things into water. M. Meyerson 
views this process of identification, this search for identity, as 
the very nerve of thought, reason, and science, of the intellecfas 
ipse. Hume, the empiricist, fa driven to his skeptical goal along 
the highway of rationalism. The judgment which identifies the 
relation of causal efficacy and determination with the ·relation of 
mere temporal sequence of otherwise unrelated and undetermined 
items, yields the nerve of his skeptical conclusion. And just this 
judgment evinces the logic of sheer identity which is the crux 
of traditional rationalism. 
The search for identity and the rational acts of identification 
provide themes for a discussion which would take us too far 
from our present subject. But I should like to make one com-
ment. A judgment of identity, Sis P, always, I think, expresses 
the possibility that, in a specific interest and context, P may be 
substituted for S. Substitutab1lity, never wholesale and at 
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large, but always in some restricted context, is itself a categorial 
feature of the things and items of experience. In this context 
and for this purpose, tha.t can be substituted for this. In the 
domain of arithmetic, it makes no difference whether I use 5, 
or 6 -1, or 3 + 2, or y25. They are 'identical.' Surely 
they are not. They are all different. Yet, within the context 
of definable arithmetical operations, any· one can be substituted 
for any other. If a diamond and an automobile have the same 
economic value, i.e., price, the one can be substituted for the 
other in an economic transaction. This is the meaning of their 
identical economic value. Water is H 2O. That is, for certain 
significant theoretical interests, H 2 O can be substituted for 
water. Is water really H 20? As well ask whether a diamond 
is really an automobile. One might imagine a world in which 
every single item was in every respect irreplaceable, in which 
nothing could ever be substituted for anything else. Such a 
world would be neither theoretically nor practically manageable. 
Life and knowledge, practice and theory are possible because, in 
specific contexts, some things can be substituted for others. 
When a salesman offers you a different brand of commodity from 
the one you asked for and tells you that it is just as good, he 
may be quite wrong. He probably is, but he is implicitly relying 
upon that trait of our world which makes both practical control 
and theoretical understanding possible. · This categorial feature 
of our world throws, I think, a fresh light upon various philo-
sophical problems, particularly that of individuals and univer-
sals. An entity is an individual in so far as it has no substitute. 
The nature of an individual is inexhaustible and its worth is 
priceless because it has no substitutable equivalents. Whether 
there are individuals and what they are is a different affair. 
The variety of modes of substitution is very great, and I do not 
think that the pragmatic account of instrumental substitutability 
exhausts the list. Substitution in the interests of theoretical 
understanding and mastery, in the shape of what JVI. Meyerson 
calls identification, plays its ovm relatively independent part. 
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I intend this brief excursus to show us that Hume's identi-
fication of causal determination with temporal sequence means 
nothing more than this. The temporal relation of uniform 
sequence between events may be substituted for the relation of 
causal determination in a specific interest. I shall presently 
consider what the context is which justifies such identification. 
But it can no more be talrnn to mean tha.t causal determination 
really is uniform temporal sequence than an automobile can be 
taken to be a diamond because either could be substituted for 
the other in the purchase say of a rug. Positivism is just bad 
rationalism. I am bound to accept the judgment of scientists 
that they are occupied solely with observing the temporal 
sequences of occurrences and with formulating the laws of such 
occurrences, if this is what they say. But I am not thereby con-
strained to identify causal determination with temporal sequence. 
To note the high degree of abstraction involved in the physical 
sciences means, among other things, that the interest with respect 
to which temporal sequence may be fruitfully substituted for 
causal determination is but one interest among others, and that 
it does not exhaust the range of theoretical interests. 
Hume reports, truly enough, that the organizing principles 
of primary experience cannot be located in immediately present 
impressions. Yet he assumes tha.t they ought to be there found 
if they are to be empirically verifiable and valid. Next, follow-
ing the lead of the rationalistic logic of identity, he compresses 
the manifold principles of organization into the one schemata 
of succession in time of items which have no other bond of 
connection save this. Now concomitant with this identification is 
another gross simplification in a different region. The same 
logic of identity is still his guide in this new province. No event 
in nature implies any other event. The intrinsic natures of 
things contain no ground for any relation whatever, not even 
for the temporal relations of coexistence and sequence which 
are observed to hold between them. But there is a region in 
which certain terms do determine certain relations to other terms. 
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This is the case in mathematics where one id.ea '' naturally intro-
duces'' another. In '' abstract reasoning concerning quantity 
or number," there is knowledge and demonstration because 
relations arise out of the natures of the separate terms. It is a 
part of or implied by the nature of 6 that it is twice 3. It is not 
a part of the nature of bread that it nourishes. This is a syn-
thetic judgment about the conjunction of two separate matters 
of fact. Mathematical judgments are analytic. They are 
tautological because the relation. between any two or more terms 
which can be traversed. by reason collapses into the sheer relation 
of identity. Even if it be supposed that the logical relation of 
implication. is not the relation. of identity, that reasoning is not 
a tautological process, nevertheless the implicative relation. of 
thought and discourse would still be utterly different from the 
relation. which holds between impressions and matters of fact. 
One proposition. may imply another; one event in nature never 
implies another event in the same meaning of 'implies.' If the 
province of reason and thought be restricted. to the implicative 
relation, and especially if the relation of implication be itself 
resolved into the relation. of id()ntity, nothing is clearer than that 
all inference from· one matter of fact to another can have no 
tincture of anything reasonable about it. Nat~e and experience 
fall apart into atomic, isolated bits unless they can be viewed as 
tied together by the relation. of deductive, logical implication. 
It is the logic of identity which leads to the extraordinary con-
clusion that if deductive tautology does not supply the glue, 
there isn't any. glue at all. Paradoxical as it may seem, Hume's 
philosophy represents the culmination of the rationalist tradition. 
which sees in the structures first of deductive logic and then of 
mathematics, and sees in these alone, the earmarks of reason. 
But Hume discerned., what Spinoza did not, the vast gulf which 
separates all inductive probability, ail inference from experience, 
all life and practice, from reason thus 1mderstood and defined. 
When Mr. Russell says that the rational man will doubt whether 
his food will nourish him, and whether the sun will rise tomor-
row, he too is basing such skepticism upon the restriction of 
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reason to the assertion of strict implication and mathematical 
identity. 
For Hume, there is no possible bridge from relations holding 
between things and events (resolved by Hume into merely tem-
poral relations), to such relations and structures as may fairly 
be called rational (resolved by Hume and current Positivism into 
essential tautologies). Both of these reductions and simplifica-
tions are carried out in accordance with the apparent demands 
of the logic of identity. It is this double resolution which issues 
in Hume's uneasy avowal that the world in which he plays back-
gammon and converses with his friends, can lay no claim to 
reasonable validity or intelligibility. It is reasonable to a.clmowl-
edge the presence of what is indubitably immediate, and it is 
reasonable to make tautologous assertions. This is where Hume 
ought to have stopped. We have seen that he went somewhat 
beyond this. He came to rely upon the memory of previous 
occurrences and sequences of events as providing a merely 
psychological and human basis for the expectation of similar 
sequences in the :future. But this kind of ovedraft upbn memory 
can be validated neither by immediate presentations nor by 
rational identities. It, no less than the principle of causal deter-
mination, involves an appeal to, what on Hume's premises must 
be quite extra-rational principles. 
The question of causality comes then to this: Is the temporal 
conjunction of otherwise loose and separate events the only dis-
coverable relation among· the occurrences: of nature~ If it is, 
and if the only relation which can be said to be rational or 
intelligible is that of tautological identity, then it follows first, 
that the most which causality can mean is uniform succession in 
time (and even this is an irrational ovedraft), and second, that 
none of the patterns of nature's processes are intelligible. 
Now it is frequently supposed that there is essentially only 
one alternative type of theory, that according to which the cause 
of an event does not merely precede it with mo-re or less uniform-
ity, but that the cause actively produces or generates its effect. 
Either a functional theory or a productivity theory, either mere 
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temporal succession or enforced succession. And we are invited 
to inspect the temporal transition from cause to effect and dis-
cover something additional to the mere fact of sequence, some 
bond of necessary connection between the two events. The out-
come of any such inspection of the transition from one state of 
affairs to another can be predicted in advance, especially if the 
notion of necessity has already been compressed into the relation 
of deductive, logical identity. Cause and effect are two events 
and they are different. Were they linked by necessary logical 
identity, they could not possibly be different, temporally, quali-
tatively, or even numerically. And let the experienced transition 
from one event to the other be as close and intimate as you 
please, let the cause be perceived to flow directly into the effect, 
still in the end nothing but temporal succession is experienced. 
Hume is on solid ground as long as the issue is defined in terms 
of . the alternative between the mere succession or the enforced 
succession of two discriminable events. 
Is there any other alternative? Suppose that we enlarge 
somewhat our area of observation. We will, in a fashion, do 
what Hume did when he appealed to memory. Causality is not 
an affair either of any single impression or even o.f an isolated 
pair of events. In vain will one search for causality in the 
immediately given, no matter whether it be a momentary datum 
or a directly perceived transition from one datum to another. 
Causality denotes a more comprehensive, categorial relation, 
exemplified if at all only in a larger range and in a wider con-
text of events. Remember that we first found causality as an 
organizing principle of primary experience. Suppose that some 
species of causal determination over and above mere temporal 
sequence did characterize trains of occurrences in nature, where 
would one go to look for it? Plato, in search of justice, sug-
gested that we first look for it in the organization of the com-
munity before we seek to locate it in the individual soul. No 
other relation than that of temporal sequence appears discover-
able within the specious present. Let us see what we find when 
we enlarge the area of observation. The question may be thus 
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stated: What is the occasion and what are the circumstances 
which elicit and sugg·est the notion of control and determination, 
a relation other than mere temporal conjunction~ There is the 
familiar appeal to some experience of activity, of dynamic 
efficacy. That this is quite inadequate for the purpose has been 
repeatedly shown. The source of the concept of causal deter-
mination lies elsewhere and in areas of wider spread and range. 
Causality means a certain type of organization of events. It 
names the relational structure characteristic of that kind of 
organization. Its source lies in the experience which we have 
of such organized structures. 
We can, at the outset, define in thought two different possible 
types of relation among events. Our definitions may be regarded 
as quite arbitrary definitions of possible structures irrespective 
of any question as to whether or not they are exemplified in real 
occurrences and things. On the one hand, there is the relation 
of temporal sequence among events ar-b-a etc. On the other 
hand there is the relation of temporal sequence, a-b-c {ltc. pliis 
the additional relation in which the respective items a b c, and 
the order of their occurrence, are determined by some general 
scheme, by something, call it x, which pervades and overlaps 
the successive items. In the first sort of situation there is 
nothing but the temporal sequence a-b-c. In the second type 
of situation there is indeed temporal sequence which, qua tem-
poral sequence, in no way differs from the first. But there sub-
sists here a new and different relation, one which can be described 
only by some term connoting determination. The relation be-
tween the general scheme-to use this very abstract term-and 
the successive items which exemplify the general scheme is not 
itself a relation of temporal sequence. N-0r do I mean by the 
general scheme merely the rule or law according to which 
uniform sequences occur. Laws do not prescribe or determine 
the occurrence of events. I mean by a; general scheme something 
quite different. I mean anything in the shape of a governing 
tendency, something dominant and pervasive, whose determining 
presence throughout the temporal sequence makes it more than 
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a mere ~emprn:-al conjunction of otherwise loose and und~ter-
mined events. The notion of prescription, of determination, of 
a causal tie which is additional to temporal sequence derives 
from our acquaintance with such instances of organization. It 
is not derived primarily from an immediate experience of activ-
ity. I have borrowed the term "general scheme" from Bosan-
quet. The characteristic of organization, he writes, '' is control 
by a general scheme as opposed to influence by juxtaposition of 
units" (Philosophical Theory of the State, 151). But if all we 
were dealing with were juxtaposition of units, we ought not 
to speak 'Of "influence." Juxtaposition is never more than 
temporal sequence. Determining influence, if present at all, is 
to be found in the constraint exerted not by some juxtaposed 
unit upon its neighbor, but by the general scheme and the total 
content demanded by that scheme. 
If causal determination does mean a. type of organization 
more complex than serial juxtaposition of units, our easiest 
illustrations· would ,be found in regions where we are most 
familiar with instances of such organization, i.e., in the expres-
sion of intent, and in purposive behavior. Discourse is a tem-
poral succession of sounds or marks, syllables, words, phrases, 
sentences. .All discourse, from the babbling of nonsense syllables 
to a sustained and cogent argument is at least a series of events. 
By discourse is here meant, of course, not the contents asserted, 
but the psycholog-i.cal and physiological events which assert 
contents. Being a temporal series of occurrences, whether or 
not or in\ what degree characterized by regularity, is the least 
common denominator of all discourse. But some instances of 
discourse are also an exposition, narrative or argument, an 
orderly array of words determined by some general subject 
matter or thesis. Control by this general scheme pervades the 
entire sequence so that it is not merely a next to next affair, now 
this· item and then that. In addition to temp'Oral succession 
there· is determination. In spealci.J;i.g or ·writing, what is the 
cause of uttering some specific word -or phrase, why do I go on 
to the second half of a sentence after finishing the first half Y 
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Unless there is some one thing that I want to say, the saying of 
which is spread out in a series of words, there would be nothing 
but temporal seque:r;i.ce. The '' some one· thing that I want to 
say" is the general scheme, the x which overlaps the successive 
items. It is this x which does the determining if anything does.· 
Now I think it is this kind o.f situation which suggests the oper-
ative presence of determining factors over and above merely 
watching changes "Of scenery, a panorama of successive events 
following one another with more or less uniformity. 
Similarly, in purposive behavior there is determination by a 
general scheme. .Any plan of action, proposed end and means, 
denotes an organization of successive items "Of behavior, in addi-
tion to the temporal sequence of events. There is nothing neces-
sarily mythical, animistic, or mythological in imputing to animal 
behavior something like a governing propensity, determining the 
sequence of muscular contractions and bodily responses through-
out the entire series of events denoted by the phrase '' rat learn-
ing to find his way to food through a maze.'' The expressions 
appropriately used by Mr. Tolman (Purposive Behavior, passim) 
"objectively defined capacities," "immanent determinants," 
definitely stand for something additional to any string of events, 
whether uniform or not. There is here a determining factor 
spread along the entire series, not compressible into any specific 
occasion or sequence of occasions. There is a determining gen-
eral scheme. Were there no such general determinant discover-
able in the situation, there would be no basis for distinguishing 
this kind of series from a simple temporal succession. It may 
be added that the discovery of such immanent determinants is 
not dependent upon introspection. Indeed, introspection limited 
as it is to the specious present or to the just vanishing phase of 
the just preceding specious present, is singularly inept to make 
any such discovery. 
Is there anything analogous to determinations by a general 
scheme in· physical processes as well as in discourse and in 
organic behaviorf The physical order appears to be a con-
catenation of things and events, juxtaposed, where all relations 
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are of the next to next sort, where immediate impact is the sole 
relevant antecedent of change, where action at a distance is 
inconceivable. A row of ninepins where change is propagated 
through direct impact of neighbor upon neighbor supplies the 
basic cue for traditional types of materialistic naturalism. There 
appears here little or no trace of the operative presence of any 
determining general scheme in addition to next to next temporal 
succession. Indeed, if the physical order be defined in terms 
of the categories of space and time, ea.ch an independent absolute, 
then we should not expect to find in the physical order any rela-
tions other than those of spatial continuity and temporal succes-
s10n. Both relations are, prima. facie, of the next to next sort 
rather than relations subsisting between a. general scheme and 
particular items. In such next to next impact there is no action 
at a distance across spa~e. And in such next to next immediate 
succession in time, there is no persistence of continuant struc-
tures. Each present state is replaced by its immedjate successor. 
The physical order thus conceived exhibits the maximum of im-
mediacy and the minimum of organization. With the physical 
order defined in such terms, physical causality can only mean 
temporal succession with as much or as little uniformity as may 
be observed. It is not surprising that in general physicists have 
favored a functional theory of causality. But the immediacy 
of impact and of next to next temporal succession is, I suspect, 
a good deal of an abstraction, and I also suspect that there are 
some grounds for ascribing to the physical order itself some-
thing in the way of general schemes, spanning spa.tial and tem-
poral distances, thus supplementing the mere sequence of events. 
Of course, only the physicist has the right to say whether he 
finds any use for this type of relational structure among events, 
a structure which shows determinination by some general scheme 
as well as temporal succession. 
But I am not here particularly concerned with empirical 
illustrations, nor do I care how scarce or common they are sup-
posed to be, nor whether they are found only in the world of life 
and mind and not in the physical order as such. I want to stress 
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the difference between two types of relation among events. One 
type is that of mere succession. We might call it the Humean 
type. We may call the other type that of succession with dom-
inant determination. Both types display a temporal succession 
of events. If now, your interest in observing events is such that 
it can be satisfied by attending solely to the temporal order of 
the events, you will not discern any difference between these two 
types. .And the important thing to note is that both the interest 
in prediction and the interest in control are concerned primarily 
. with lmowing what comes after w~at. Any temporal sequence 
exhibiting some measure of uniformity provides the basis for a 
corresponding measure both of prediction and of control. That 
is, the specific and the pragmatic questions, what follows what, 
and what is to be done if you want some definite event to occur, 
call for no more than a description of sequences and of their 
mutual, functional correlations. If you want to catch causal 
determination as well as temporal sequence, you will have to 
employ a different kind of net. .A sequence of events is causal 
in addition to being temporal only if the successive events supply 
evidence of· a persistent, dominant determinant or general 
scheme. The discovery of causal determination is dependent 
upon the discovery of organization. Our human concern with 
organized structures and processes is different from any sheer 
interest we take in watching things go by, as when we sit in a 
train and observe the panorama of changing scenes. Our con-
cern with organized structures is also different from our interest 
in predicting specific future events and in controlling the 
sequence of occurrences. This alternative, that of idly staring 
at things or effectively controlling them, appears to be the one 
with which Mr. Dewey presents us in asking us to choose between 
a spectator account of knowledge or an operational and instru-
mental interpretation of the cognitive interest. Our interest in 
iindersta.ndin.g things seems to me to coincide with neither of 
these two alternatives. The interest in mganized structures is 
the formal earmark of reason, both theoretical and practical. 
Reason evinces a concern for form, for determination of specific 
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items and sequences by a general scheme. Temporal successions 
become intelligible, they are understood in proportion as the suc-
cessive events are discovered to be determined by dominant 
forms. Such intelligibility contributes nothing, at least directly, 
to either· prediction or control. .All that these require is refer-
ence to temporal succession. Meaning and intelligibility, as 
well as causal determination, spring from the presence of dom-
inant general schemes. 
The categories of substance and of causal determination are 
yielded through no specific . nor pragmatic inquiry. They are 
discovered through reflective inquiries. Nor are they simply 
given in momentary experience. Whence, for reflection, are they 
fetched f Where else but from primary experience where they 
are pre-reflectively employed, where their operative and func-
tional presence gives meaning, depth and solidity to the world 
in which men live and act. The relation between primary experi-
ence and reflection is analogous to the relation between process 
and form which I have sketched· in an earlier paper. The _cate-
gories which thought requires to render the world intelligible are 
not arbitrarily projected into things. Nor are they just found 
in spots, localized in specific regions of middle"-sized fact. They 
are not merely an affair of deductive logic, of sheer identities 
and tautologies, belonging to an independent world of discursive 
reason. Least of all are they just irrational, instinctive proclivi-
ties springing from an animal faith which is the polar opposite 
.of all that is intelligible and reasonable. 
The validity of the category of causality in understanding 
and in interpreting nature's processes depends then upon one 
condition. This category is valid only in so• far as the processes 
of nature possess an organized structure which is expressed and 
spread out in the temporal sequences of events, making of them 
something more than mere sequences. The interesting thing is 
that the same principle which renders intelligible a sequence of 
events, i.e., organization by a dominant, general scheme, is also 
the source of causal determination. It should be added that this 
·category, like all others, is wholly abstract and formal. It tells 
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us nothing of the kind or range of organization which we may 
expect to find. The inexhaustible fertility of nature's processes 
generate a diversity of organized structures, with varying ranges 
and areas of causal determination. It is these which occupy the 
region between the two extremes of mere temporal succession and 
of pure tautology. There is no causality at these extremes. But 
these are just ideal limits, the products of abstract substitu-
tions. But whether or not these two opposite extremes are ideal 
limits, at least we have located causality. It is present wherever 
processes are organized. .All processes which are comprised 
between these two ideal limits exhibit some kind and degree of 
organization and hence of causal determination. 
